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CONSTRAINED REGULATORY EXIT IN
ENERGY LAW
JIM Rossi & HANNAH J. WISEMANt
ABSTRACT

In recent years, the federal government's efforts to open up
competitive electricity markets have transformed how we think about
the regulation of energy. In many respects, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's (FERC) broad "deregulatory" efforts,
which commenced in the 1990s, might appear to be a case of
paradigmaticregulatoryexit as defined by J. B. Ruhl and Jim Salzman.
But our case study of FERC's restructuring of wholesale electricity
markets reveals some important institutionalfeatures that make exit in
federalism contexts, and under federal statutory duties, a rich and
difficult problem. In the context of energy, exit from one regulatory
sphere can create regulatorygaps. This has led FERC, which largely
exited the regulationof wholesale electricity rates, to increaseregulation
in other spheres. It has also invited forms of intergovernmental
exchange, as states have emulated or otherwise responded to FERC's
regulatory modifications in the areas in which states have jurisdiction.
In this sense, the transition to competitive energy supply markets has
involved constrained exit characterizedby a hydraulic back-and-forth
between regulators and institutionsin an effort to ensure that statutory
duties are fulfilled and other public needs are met.
This assessment of regulatory exchange has a prescriptive
implication: a federal regulator seeking to exit specific forms of
conventional regulation needs to proactively develop strategies to
facilitate regulatory exchange, while simultaneously preserving its
authority over important substantive values related to its regulatory
mission. Attention to "offsetting" regulations is often necessary to
ensure that problematic regulatory gaps will not arise. In the energy
context, these strategies might also include the use of mechanisms that
give other institutionsa voice in implementing exit strategies, as well as
better ex ante regulatory planning for market enforcement that will
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continue after partial exit. We argue that it is not only a good strategy
for federal regulatorsto recognize this hydraulicfeature of exit, but that
cooperative federalism statutes such as the Federal Power Act often
requirethem to do so.
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INTRODUCTION
A vast body of administrative law scholarship assumes that
regulations are relatively sticky. Agency officials and staff members
cling to the issues deemed to be highest priority and zealously guard
their regulatory turf and the scarce resources associated with it.' A
growing subset of the literature focuses on regulatory adaptation and
dynamism, recognizing that too often there is not enough flexibility for
the regulatory modifications needed to address changing issues over
time or to experiment with new regulatory approaches.2 These
literatures reveal the classic tension between entrenchment and

1. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information
Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEx. L. REV. 1409, 1441 (2008) ("Once established,
bureaucracies do not surrender power lightly."); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a
PostscriptAssessment of the Iron Law of FinancialRegulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25,47 (2014)
(noting "an agency's inherent bias in interpreting the independent experts' analysis in support of
the regulatory status quo or its agenda").
2. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, DesigningAdministrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014); Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory,
Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 945 (2005) (noting adaptive management
scholars' belief that "agencies . . . can reap the benefits of structured learning over time through
a systematic program of active experimentation").
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certainty on the one hand, and the need for flexibility on the other.
Professors J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman have identified a
powerful form of regulatory transition that threatens to upset the
balance between certainty and flexibility-a transition that they define
as "exit," meaning an agency's reduction or elimination of regulation
in a particular sphere.3 Their typology of various forms of exit offers
useful strategies for many regulatory settings. Dramatic political shifts
provide an especially stark reminder of the tension between regulatory
certainty and flexibility. For example, in the environmental context,
President Trump quickly announced an intent to withdraw from the
international Paris Agreement on climate' and appointed a director of
the Environmental Protection Agency with an avowed distaste for
many environmental regulations.' Although similar sudden reforms
have occurred in the past,7 recent events such as these remind us of the
need for better analytical tools to help regulators strike a balance
between entrenchment and flexibility during times of political and
policy disruption.
Few industries in the United States have experienced as much
disruption over the past 50 years as the electric power sector. It should
thus not be surprising that one of Ruhl and Salzman's many
illustrations of exit comes from energy law; they describe the
movement to competitive energy markets as a form of "adaptive exit."'
This Article accepts the framework of their typology. But it also argues
that the example of "exit" in energy requires further examination
before it can produce useful lessons for regulatory exit generally.9

3. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (2015)
(defining exit as "the intentional, significant reduction in governmental intervention initiated at
a particular time under specified processes and conditions" (emphasis omitted)).
4. Id. at 1316-23.
5. Statement by PresidentTrump on the ParisClimate Accord, WHITEHoUSE.GOV (June 1,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statement/statement-president-trump-paris-climate
-accord [https://perma.cc/276E-D79M].
6. Coral Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt as E.P.A. Head, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmental-protectionagency.html [https://perma.cc./XH45-BFVY].
7. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back Door: The HardWay to Fight
a Revolution, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 521 passim (1990) (describing President Reagan's broad
deregulatory efforts, which began immediately upon Reagan assuming office).
8. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1321-22.
9. Consider that, where there is potential for either state or federal regulation, pure exit
requires both state and federal regulators to exit (quadrant1, below). Outside of this possibility,
if the federal government retains regulatory power but the states fully exit, there would seem to
be a strong possibility for unitary regulation, as may occur through federal preemption (quadrant
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Lessons from the energy sector suggest that often, "regulatory exit" is
better characterized as a form of constrained exit that we call
"hydraulic regulatory exchange." This exchange is a regulatory or
policy change at a federal, state, or other governmental level in
response to partial deregulation or other modifications of the
regulatory status quo. We identify two distinct forms of exchange: first,
intra-agency exchange, in which an agency augments certain
deregulatory efforts with regulations aimed at other activities in order
to meet its statutory duties, and second, intergovernmentalexchange, in
which governments at other levels respond to federal exit with
regulations that emulate the federal exit response but sometimes differ
from it, or that compete with the federal approach. Importantly, within
this exchange of regulations or institutions, "exit" is rarely the
reduction or elimination of regulation in a regulatory area. Rather, it
involves a federal agency, state, or other institution changing its
regulatory approach or opting out of one type of regulation, while
simultaneously increasing regulation elsewhere in order to achieve a
policy goal.
These types of exchange-in which only partial deregulation or
even a net expansion of regulation occurs -result from two factors that
constrain the classic exit case defined by Ruhl and Salzman. Federal
statutes tend to create duties that agencies may not abandon through
exit, thus sometimes requiring offsetting protective regulation.
Additionally, these statutes sometimes divide authority in a particular
regulatory area between federal and sub-federal institutions, thus
making intergovernmental regulatory exchange likely. The Federal
Power Act (FPA)-the enabling statute of the Federal Energy
2, below). Where states remain but the federal government exits, there is state regulation
(quadrant3, below). This Article argues that the Federal Power Act (FPA) largely operates in
quadrant4, containing those situations in which the federal and state governments both retain
some regulatory authority-a relationship we generally describe as "cooperative federalism."
This Article's use of cooperative federalism is distinct from the more narrowly defined use of the
term, which refers to states implementing federal mandates under acts such as the Clean Air Act.
This Article aims to provide an account of the dynamic interaction that occurs as the federal
government moves toward exit in the cooperative federalism context-as a way of mediating
exchange between the state and federal spheres, rather than forcing federal or state regulators to
move into other quadrants.
Table 1.
Feds Full Exit

Feds Remain

States Fully Exit

(1) Pure Exit

(2) Unitary Preemption

States Remain

(3) State Regulation

(4) Cooperative Federalism
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Regulatory Commission (FERC)-provides a classic example of both
of these factors. FERC's primary duty under the FPA is to ensure that
rates are "just and reasonable,""o thus facilitating intra-agency
regulatory exchange and making full exit unlikely. Further, the FPA
increases the likelihood of intergovernmental exchange if any federal
exit occurs; it tasks FERC with regulating wholesale sales (power sales
between two different utilities or between generators and utilities) and
the transmission of wholesale electricity,n while it specifically reserves
to the states authority over generation and retail electricity (sales from
utilities directly to customers).' 2 FERC's efforts under the FPA to
better serve consumers by enhancing competition in the electricity
sector powerfully demonstrate both forms of exchange.
Beginning in the 1990s, FERC initiated a broad project to undo
conventional delivery of electric power by vertically integrated utilities
that operated as franchises free from competition and subject to
regulated rates. 3 The "exit" that occurred in this case was exit from a
particular type of regulation (traditional rate regulation). FERC
decided that its duty of ensuring just and reasonable rates would be
better achieved by encouraging competition in electricity generation,
thus exiting the regulation of wholesale rates.14 At the same time,
10. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012). The phrase "just and reasonable" refers to both protecting
consumers from excessive rates but also protecting utilities from exceedingly low rates that would
prevent utilities from recovering the costs they incur in fulfilling obligations to customers. See
Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (noting that to be just
and reasonable, utility rates must involve "balancing of the investor and the consumer interests");
Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 693
(1923) (noting that under the "just and reasonable" standard, the financial return to the utility
under the rates it is allowed to charge "should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the
financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical
management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the
proper discharge of its public duties").
11. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (indicating that "[tihe provisions of this subchapter shall apply to
the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce").
12. See id. (providing that the commission "shall not have jurisdiction ... over facilities used
for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the
transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce," as well as certain other transmission).
13. See FERC Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540,21,541 (May 10, 1996) (codified at
18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) [hereinafter Order No. 888] ("Today the Commission issues three final,
interrelated rules designed to remove impediments to competition in the wholesale bulk power
marketplace and to bring more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation's electricity
consumers.").
14. See infra notes 15-16.
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FERC enhanced regulation in the transmission area, forcing the
opening up of transmission lines, which often served as bottlenecks
preventing access to cheap wholesale generators."
FERC's new approach removed the commission from detailed
oversight of power supply investment decisions, enhanced the
commission's role in regulating transmission, and created a
competitive interstate energy market." During this transition,
intergovernmental regulatory exchange also occurred, in part because
FERC pressured states-which share authority with FERC under the
FPA and regulate retail electricity markets-to deregulate or open up
portions of these markets. When this regulatory restructuring took off
in earnest, a significant number of states whose customers were saddled
with high-cost and obsolete power generation assets followed FERC's
restructuring lead.18 But the state regulatory response tended to
entrench distinct regulatory approaches-some of which emulated
FERC's lead, and others of which differed substantially from it. In an
example of a state emulating partial federal exit," California required
utilities to acquire all of their power through a competitive
marketplace but failed to implement adequate protections against

15. See Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,543 (concluding that its rule requiring enhanced
access to transmission lines and associated approval of more competitive wholesale rates for
generators that could show a lack of market power would "remedy undue discrimination in
transmission services in interstate commerce and provide an orderly and fair transition to
competitive bulk power markets").
16. See FERC Order No. 816, Refinements to Policies and Procedures for Market-Based
Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities,
80 Fed. Reg. 67,056, 67,057 (Oct. 30, 2015) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafterOrder No.
816] (describing the Commission's history of approving market-based rates in lieu of regulated
cost-of-service rates).
17. Much of the pressure from FERC involved encouraging utilities within states-which
tend to generate and transmit both wholesale and retail electric power-to hand over operational
control of their transmission lines to regional entities called independent system operators or
regional transmission organizations. These regional entities, once formed would run competitive
wholesale markets for the electricity flowing through the lines and would generally allow both
retail and wholesale electricity customers to access more generators because these generators
would have broader geographic options for transmission and selling electricity. See, e.g., FERC
Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 831 (Jan. 6, 2000)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafterOrder No. 2000] (encouraging the formation of regional
transmission organizations); Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,542 (encouraging the formation
of independent system operators).
18. See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATUS OF STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY
RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY AS OF FEBRUARY 2003, at 1-2 (2003), https://www.eia.gov/

electricity/policies/legislation/californialpdf/restructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR4B-05SBJ.
19. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1321-22 (describing pricing problems in the California
marketplace).
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gaming of the system, leading to unusually high wholesale (and retail)
electricity prices.20
Additionally, as FERC has partially exited the sphere of electricity
regulation, stakeholders have looked to regional, state, and local
institutions to address important consumer protection, reliability, and
environmental goals.21 In this sense, the shifting demand for new forms
of regulation expands and contracts as regulatory exit at the federal
level changes. This has forced federal and state regulators to engage in
an ongoing exchange of jurisdictional control, with FERC
acknowledging state control of activities related to retail electricity
sales and other activities while zealously protecting its jurisdictional
authority over other areas. For example, with wholesale electricity
competition already underway, FERC attempted to further encourage
competition by permitting the "non-use" of electricity to be bid into
markets in lieu of expensive generation during times of peak electricity
demand; 22 in doing so, FERC allowed states to opt out or "veto" this
federally created market by prohibiting retail users of electricity users
from bidding their non-use into federal markets. Additionally, some
states have maintained traditional regulation of their retail electricity
sectors to control retail prices and prevent large fluctuations, in part
out of a concern that problems similar to those seen in California could
arise.23 This kind of exchange has been enabled by a statutory
framework that was designed to fill regulatory gaps, and that expressly
preserves a role for states.24
The fact that exit is constrained by statutes and often causes
regulatory responses at the federal level or at other levels of
government -particularly under statutes colored by federalism
undertones-calls for a broader understanding of even more

20. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. Dynegy Power Mktg., 384 F.3d 756, 759
(9th Cir. 2004) (noting that "[i]n the markets the PX [Power Exchange] and ISO [Independent
System Operator] managed, rates for wholesale electricity rose dramatically during 2000 and
2001," and noting alleged gaming of the markets).
21. See, e.g., Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos. 17 CV 1163 & 17 CV 1164, 2017 WL
3008289, at *1 (N.D. 111. July 14, 2017) (addressing the zero-emission credit program in Illinois).
22. FERC Order 719, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets,
73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,119 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
23. Johannes P. Pfeifenberger, The Brattle Group, Electricity Market Restructuring: Where
Are We Now? Presentation to the National Conference of State Legislatures Energy Policy
Forum (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/energy/EnergyPfei fenberger
Johannes-present.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HVB-WHBE (noting that "[o]nly 15 states fully
restructured their retail electricity markets").
24. See infra Part II.
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complicated exit strategies than Ruhl and Salzman anticipated in their
initial analysis of exit. A close look at the examples from the exit
literature's typology reveals that pure regulatory exit may be more of
a theory than a reality, and that what this Article describes as
constrained exit in the form of regulatory exchange is a far more
common and potentially feasible approach, at least in the energy
sector. This Article argues that regulatory exit strategies need to
anticipate and facilitate the two forms of hydraulic regulatory exchange
we identify. Specifically, in planning for exit a federal agency needs to
map out a vision for the future and also needs to ensure that it is able
to preserve statutory obligations (typically through intra-agency
regulatory exchange) and navigate complex, often unpredictable
responses from other levels of government in the form of
intergovernmental exchange. Proactive planning for hydraulic
regulatory exchange is important to create more effective responses to
regulatory gaps, to mediate conflicts among agencies with overlapping
responsibilities in the regulatory area, and to ensure that agencies
maintain statutory responsibilities when exiting a regulatory area.
Hydraulic regulatory exchange not only responds to private
stakeholders, who bargain between regulators, but can provide various
forms of insurance against future regulatory change as well. As law and
psychology would suggest, individual officials have an incentive to
preserve at least part of their role even when pursuing certain forms of
exit,25 and where there is greater potential for jurisdictional overlap, we
would expect regulators to hold on to the option to reverse exit.
Regulated industries, too, will want to preserve options to undo exit
where there is a threat of undetermined forms of new regulation in the
future.26 It is therefore important that exit strategies incorporate and
facilitate exchange, with an aim toward striking a balance between
certainty and flexibility.
In arguing for a nuanced definition of exit that includes regulatory
exchange and proposing ways to better navigate this exchange, this
Article highlights two aspects of exit that are sometimes absent from

25. See Karkkainen, supranote 1, at 1441; see also, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act:
A Reassessment of the Ossification CritiqueofJudicialReview, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251,259-67 (2009)
(describing agency staff members' and agency heads' incentives).
26. Cf E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326
(1985) (noting that although industry groups would have preferred no regulation in certain areas,
they pushed for federal environmental law as an alternative to somewhat unpredictable, varied,
and strict state laws).
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"pure exit" conversations: that regulators are nearly always
constrained by statutes when exiting, and that other regulatory entities
often fill spaces created by partial exit or make similar or conflicting
regulatory changes within their own jurisdictional spheres.
Part I introduces conventional regulation of interstate energy
markets. In Part II, the Article describes FERC's efforts to exit
portions of the field of wholesale electricity regulation through
restructuring and the constraints on exit created by the FPAconstraints that lead to intra-agency and intergovernmental exchange
rather than classic exit. Part III then explores how competitive energy
markets have opened up hydraulic forms of regulatory exchange as
states work to address changing public needs, such as demands to
address climate change. It analyzes FERC's allowance for state veto as
one form of managing and proactively planning for hydraulic
exchange. Part III also discusses the ongoing ambiguity surrounding
state exit from interstate energy markets-a form of reactive exit that
must be monitored to ensure that it does not entrench new forms of
market power.
Part IV highlights how the need for regulatory exit strategies to
address and facilitate exchange will increase with greater overlap of the
missions of different regulatory institutions. This may produce greater
demand for approaches to exit that manage hydraulic regulatory
exchange, including efforts to give more of a voice to states or other
institutions. However, we warn, these efforts must be approached
carefully to avoid the creation of new dysfunctions.
I. TRADITIONAL REGULATION OF INTERSTATE ENERGY MARKETS

Upon first glance, FERC's regulatory and deregulatory strategies

to expand competition in the electricity sector ("electricity
restructuring") over the past three decades are a classic "exit" story, in
that the commission in many respects attempted to extricate itself from
regulatory intervention to encourage competition in the provision of
electricity. FERC in many senses did not exit the regulatory sphere,
however. Indeed, FERC had to issue new regulations to ensure that
markets would, in fact, be competitive. Thus, the energy law story
differs from the types of exit described within Professors Ruhl and
Salzman's pathbreaking work on regulatory exit,27 and, we argue, is

27. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1302 (defining exit in terms of reduced governmental
intervention).
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better categorized as regulatory exchange. The energy regulatory
exchange story is also notable because Congress did not appear to
intend for any form of exit in the energy enabling statutes, thus creating
complications for FERC's exit strategies.
Congress enacted the FPA-the statute that creates broad federal
authority over electricity generation and transmission-in response to
concerns about a regulatory gap created by the Supreme Court in the
Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam Company case.28 In
holding that states could not regulate wholesale rates charged by a
utility in another state, the Court in Attleboro created a space that
could not legally be filled through state action and that the federal
government had not yet addressed.29 Thus, Congress enacted the FPA
to occupy this previously "unregulated" area. The FPA contains broad
jurisdictional language mandating federal involvement in interstate
electricity transactions. In its declaration of policy, Congress
emphasized that federal regulation of interstate wholesale electricity
sales was "necessary in the public interest."3 0 And the substantive
portions of the FPA extended federal authority to both the
transmission and wholesale sale of interstate electricity.3 1 At the same
time, Congress expanded federal involvement in this area through
other statutes in an effort to further protect the public from
anticompetitive activity in the area of wholesale electricity. For
example, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA)
required many utilities to register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and obtain SEC approval before issuing securities
or acquiring other generators and power companies, among other
measures. 32
In carrying out its FPA duties, FERC came to be heavily involved
in the regulation of wholesale electricity sales and transmission. Any

28. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927).
29. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 20 (2002) (noting that "[i]t is clear that the enactment of
the FPA in 1935 closed the 'Attleboro gap' by authorizing federal regulation of interstate,
wholesale sales of electricity" but emphasizing that the FPA was more than a gap-filling statute
because it also extended federal jurisdiction into areas previously regulated by states and
provided for federal jurisdiction over areas not at issue in Attleboro, including electricity
transmission); Attleboro, 273 U.S. at 90 (holding that states could not regulate rates charged for
the sale of wholesale electricity from a utility in one state to a utility in another state).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).
31. Id. § 824(b).
32. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, §§ 5, 6, 9, 49 Stat. 803,
812-15, 817-18 (repealed and replaced by the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 2005 as part
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 974).
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electric utility proposing to sell electricity wholesale had to first obtain
FERC approval of the rate to be charged. For most of the twentieth
century, this endeavor required a lengthy "cost-of-service" ratemaking proceeding in which FERC assessed the capital and operating
costs for each utility (including the utility's need to provide returns to
shareholders), establishing a just and reasonable rate based on this
detailed information.33 Similarly, each owner and operator of an
electric transmission line over which FERC had jurisdiction had to
obtain FERC approval of the rates to be charged for other utilities' use
of the line and approval of the terms of service that would be offered
to these utilities." Users of those transmission lines had to grapple with
numerous rates if they sent electricity over lines owned by different
utilities.35 And under PUHCA, the SEC had to give the green light to
most utility stock offerings and mergers, among other transactions. 36
Over time, it became increasingly apparent to Congress and
FERC that guarding the "public interest"-that is, protecting
electricity consumers from unreasonable rates and anticompetitive
practices, and also preserving reasonable profits for utilities37-would
require more than the oversight of rates and business transactions and
might necessitate certain forms of exit to allow positive market forces
to prevail." Utilities continued to exercise monopolistic power over
electricity markets by favoring incumbent power plants over new
entrants jealously guarding use of their own transmission lines-thus
33. See Ari Peskoe, EasingJurisdictionalTensions by IntegratingPublic Policy in Wholesale
ElectricityMarkets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 3 (2017).
34. See, e.g., Robert J. Michaels, The Governance of Transmission Operators,20 ENERGY
L.J. 233, 235 (1999) (noting that "[t]hrough the 1970s" transmission was "supplied largely at the
discretion of its owners at cost-recovering rates").
35. David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
765,773 n.43 (2008) ("[E]ach of many owners [of the transmission grid] demanded a separate rate
from customers for the transmission of electricity along each segment of the grid (so-called
'pancaking' of rates).").
36. See James W. Moeller, Toward an SEC-FERC Memorandum of Understanding, 15
ENERGY L.J. 31, 46 (1994) (noting, prior to the repeal of PUHCA, that "it [was] unlawful under
section 9(a)(1) [of PUHCA] for registered public utility holding companies and their public utility
(or non-utility) subsidiaries to acquire the securities or assets of another electric public utility
without SEC approval").
37. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
38. See Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,540-46 (noting rising prices of electricity
produced under the old, fully-regulated system, in which FERC approved rates designed to allow
utilities to recover the costs of investments such as expensive nuclear power plants, and noting
the need to move to a more competitive model); id. at 21,550 (noting the agency's "traditional
obligation to ensure that utilities have a fair opportunity to recover prudently incurred costs and
that they maintain power supply reliability").
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preventing competitors from accessing these utilities' wholesale
customers-and refusing to build new transmission lines that would
facilitate more competitor access.3 9 In response to these and other
practices, which were challenged by wholesale buyers, the Supreme
Court made clear that electric utilities are not immune from antitrust
law and from the competitive pressures associated with this law.40
Congress, too, began to shift its focus from FPA-style regulatory
intervention to statutes designed to protect consumers through
enhanced competition in wholesale electricity. For example, Congress
exempted certain utilities from PUHCA if these utilities could show
that they were wholly in the business of generating electricity;4 1 this had
the effect of encouraging independent, competitive generators to enter
the market, thus helping to lower prices. Congress also encouraged
small generators to enter the market by requiring that utilities purchase
power from these generators and pay them a particular rate for the
power.4 2 And Congress gave FERC the power to order a utility to grant
competing utilities access to the utility's transmission lines in order to
sell to a third-party buyer-a practice called wheeling.43 Thus, although
governmental involvement in the energy sphere continued, its aim was
to enhance the power of markets and reduce the need for direct
regulation of electricity rates.
FERC also began to expand its efforts to weaken utilities'
anticompetitive powers. At first, FERC engaged in case-by-case efforts
to encourage competition. For example, it accepted and increasingly
granted applications for wholesale electricity sellers to sell power at
market-based rates," meaning that FERC would no longer cap the
39. See id. at 21,547 (concluding that previous efforts to open up transmission were
inadequate to address remaining "undue discrimination" in terms of transmission pricing and
access and noting "the problem of the disparity in transmission service that utilities provided to
third parties in comparison to their own uses of the transmission system"); id. at 21,546 (noting
that "[tihe most likely route to market power in today's electric utility industry lies through
ownership or control of transmission facilities").
40. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973) (subjecting a refusal to
deal allegation related to transmission lines to antitrust law scrutiny).
41. See Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,546-47 (describing the creation of exempt
wholesale generators (EWGs) through the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the purposes behind
it).
42. Id. at 21,545 (describing the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act and its intent of
promoting competition).
43. Id. at 21,547 (noting the Energy Policy Act's amendment to the FPA to allow FERC to
issue individualized wheeling orders, and noting FERC's use of this authority).
44. See FERC Order No. 697, Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy,
Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,904, 39,907 (July 20, 2007)
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price of electricity and would allow the seller to charge any price the
market would bear, subject to FERC monitoring for potential market
power problems.4 5 FERC also used its congressionally granted power
to issue individual wheeling orders."
FERC quickly moved toward broad-based reform in an effort to
harness competitive market powers, and this effort demonstrated how
FERC's "exit" story was in fact dominated by regulatory exchangein this case, intra-agency exchange in the form of deregulating one
regulatory sphere while enhancing regulation in another. When FERC
issued a broad-based policy to allow most wholesale rates to be
competitive rates-primarily contained within FERC Orders 697 and
816 4 7-this extricated the commission from its formal case-by-case
approval of rates. But FERC had first issued a sweeping regulatory
directive in 1996 called FERC Order 888 that required universal
wheeling, meaning that all utilities had to offer open access to their
transmission lines (within practical limits).' Without this enhanced
federal regulatory involvement in the transmission sector, efforts to
deregulate rates and allow competitive forces to protect electricity
consumers would have backfired because competitive generators of
electricity would have lacked access to transmission lines, which are
too expensive for many generators to build and operate themselves.4 9
Despite these ambitious efforts, the following Part discusses how
FERC's vision for fostering competitive markets was not fully realized,
in large measure due to the fact that FERC's strategy failed to fully
anticipate private anticompetitive practices that would still harm
consumers -practices that emerged in restructured markets at both the
federal and state levels. Further, FERC's consumer (and utility)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 697] ("In 1988, the Commission began
considering proposals for market-based pricing of wholesale power sales. The Commission acted
on market-based rate proposals filed by various wholesale suppliers on a case-by-case basis.");
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY

2000: AN UPDATE 63 (2000), https://grist.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/update2000.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RX95-9V7W].
45. Sellers still must submit individual applications for market-based rate approval, but
FERC approves many of these requests and has streamlined applicants' procedures for proving
that they lack market power-a prerequisite to obtaining this approval. See Order No. 816, supra
note 16, at 67,057; Order No. 697, supra note 44, at 39906.
46.

ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 44, at 63.

47. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
48. Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,541.
49. Id. at 21,550 (noting that "[t]ransmitting utilities own the transportation system over
which bulk power competition occurs and transmission service continues to be a natural
monopoly").
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protection missiono required any exit from conventional regulation to
better balance these kinds of goals in its substantive regulatory
approach.
II. REGULATORY EXCHANGE IN RESTRUCTURED ENERGY
MARKETS

Viewed in isolation, certain aspects of FERC's electricity
restructuring efforts-a combination of deregulation under Order 697
and 816, and enhanced regulation under Order 888-look like classic
exit, and more specifically, "adaptive, transparent exit" which is a form
that the commission did not design ex ante but later adopted as its
strategy using clear standards."' But the "exit" involved here was an
exit from traditionally regulated monopolistic electricity markets, not
from FERC regulation. FERC's electricity restructuring was designed
to facilitate a competitive electric power supply in order to reduce
electricity prices for consumers while also ensuring that utilities could
remain financially viable.
To accomplish this vision of competition, through Orders 697 and
816 FERC retroactively attempted to expand competition in the
electricity sector and crafted standards for removing commission
approval of most wholesale rates.52 Specifically, in Order 697, FERC
indicated that it would permit wholesale sellers of electricity to charge
market rates after determining that these sellers lacked market power
or had market power but had "mitigated it." 53 The commission also
required, among other things, that the seller continue to file periodic
reports so that FERC could monitor transactions over time and check
for possible changes in market power, and the commission reserved the
power to revoke a seller's authority to charge market-based rates.54
Order 816 subsequently streamlined certain aspects of the

50. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
51. RuhI & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1322-23.
52. See supra notes 44 and 45.
53. Order No. 697, supra note 44, at 39,906. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist.
No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 537-38 (2008) (describing FERC's ongoing authority over certain aspects of
the rates, noting that before the commission authorizes market-based rates it analyzes "whether
a market-based rate seller or any of its affiliates has market power in generation or transmission
and, if so, whether such market power has been mitigated" and listing the analyses that FERC
conducts when determining "whether market-based rates should be granted," including the
question of whether the proposed "market-based rate seller or any of its affiliates has market
power").
54. Order No. 697, supra note 44, at 39,906.
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commission's analysis regarding sellers' market power."
Importantly, however, FERC's deregulatory efforts with respect
to wholesale rates were enabled largely by its enhanced regulatory
effort under Order 888.56 Through a form of intra-agency exchange
(deregulation in one area, and enhanced regulation in another), this
order required all transmission line operators under FERC's
jurisdiction to file tariffs with FERC that offered use of their
transmission lines on an open-access, nondiscriminatory basis-a
dramatic shift from previous practice.57 FERC believed that when
more utilities and generators had access to transmission lines, buyers
would, in turn, have more choices, and electricity rates would decline
as a result of enhanced competition."
States responded in various ways to this effort-mimicking certain
aspects of rate deregulation at the state level5 9 or entrenching
traditional rate regulation.' FERC's effort to partially exit electricity
regulation accordingly tells a far more nuanced story than traditional
exit, and one that involves both intergovernmental and intra-agency
exchange. The FPA mandates, or at minimum encourages, both types
of exchange and therefore constrains what might otherwise be classic
exit-an overall reduction or elimination of regulation within a
regulatory field.
With respect to intergovernmental exchange, the FPA expressly
reserves room for state regulation; the federal government regulates
wholesale sales and transmission, and the states regulate retail
transactions. 61 These seemingly clear jurisdictional dividing lines are
quite blurry. Beyond the thorny nature of federalism-infused exit,
FERC's electricity restructuring efforts, California's related

55. Order No. 816, supra note 16, at 67,059.
56. See Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,550 ("Non-discriminatory open access to
transmission services is critical to the full development of competitive wholesale generation
markets and the lower consumer prices achievable through such competition.").
57. Id. at 21,541.
58. See id. ("The continuing competitive changes in the industry and the prospect of these
benefits to customers make it imperative that this Commission take the necessary steps within its
jurisdiction to ensure that all wholesale buyers and sellers of electric energy can obtain nondiscriminatory transmission access . . . .").
59. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Philip S. Cross, N.C. Defers Retail Wheeling, 133 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 48 (1995)
("Finding the state's electric regulation in excellent condition, and noting a slowdown in the
movement toward retail wheeling in other states, the North Carolina Utilities Commission (UC)
has decided against ruling on the issue at this time.").
61. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012).
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restructuring, and similar exit strategies also reveal another, more
nuanced type of exit in the form of intra-agency exchange. Agencies
wishing to exit a regulatory field in the classic sense-meaning they
want to reduce or eliminate regulation within that field-often must
retain or even enhance certain regulatory authority due to statutory
constraints. In the case of FERC, the FPA constrains exit by requiring
FERC to protect the public interest through federal regulation of
wholesale electricity and transmission.6 2
This Part describes the challenges that FERC faced with its
electricity restructuring initiatives, including jurisdictional disputes and
ambiguity with respect to the regulatory duties that FERC was
required to retain under the FPA. These duties could have more
effectively protected the public from the impacts of exit within a messy
federalism area, where both states and the federal government largely
abandoned certain regulation of electricity markets, leaving significant
gaps that invited anticompetitive pricing in energy and harmed
consumers.
A.

The Challenges of NavigatingIntergovernmentalExchange

Despite FERC's combined efforts to accomplish effective and
efficient electricity restructuring, the commission failed to establish a
comprehensive model for exit from federal regulation of the power
supply; in endorsing a competitive power supply market, FERC failed
to fully anticipate anticompetitive private behaviors. FERC's orders
also did not fully address the potential for ongoing federalism tensions
or define clearly how FERC would continue to exercise its federally
mandated duties to prevent or respond to problems that arose as a
result of exit, such as the exorbitant wholesale prices that emerged
when California deregulated its generation market.6 3
FERC was aware of the potential for these tensions and made
some efforts to address them. For example, recognizing that stateswhich have jurisdiction over retail utilities and the construction of
transmission lines-would likely block the development of a truly
regional transmission grid that would enable better competition, Order
888 encouraged the formation of regional transmission organizations

62. Id.
63. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 541 (2008)
(discussing the exorbitant rates that emerged in California and noting that "[t]he contracts
between the parties included rates that were very high by historical standards").
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as a way of coordinating the transmission grid in competitive markets.'
Through this system, utilities could opt into regional, organized power
supply markets.65 Importantly, many parts of the country still lack these
regional organizations.6 6 Subsequent FERC orders have mandated
regional planning for transmission lines,67 but it is not clear how much
this planning will in fact open up transmission lines to enable truly
regional, competitive electricity markets. Further, FERC's electricity
restructuring initiative did not - and likely could not - address all of
the difficulties that would subsequently arise in interpreting the line
between permissible deregulation and FERC's ongoing regulatory
duties.
In many respects, FERC's restructuring initiative was successful.
Competition in generation flourished,' and electricity rates did decline
in areas of the country where they had been the highest, in part due to
the enhanced competition promoted by the order.69 But several
countervailing forces substantially tempered this success. A primary
hurdle in the effort to protect consumers through the restructuring
initiative was the strong yet rather vague dual federalist structure
preserved by the FPA. Although Congress in the FPA carved out a
relatively broad area of federal authority, it also definitively preserved
64. Order No. 888, supra note 13, at 21,667. FERC further encouraged the formation of these
entities in Order No. 2000. Order No. 2000, supra note 17, at 831.
65. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Control and Governance of Transmission Organizationsin the
Restructured Electricity Industry, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 569, 586-87 (2000) (noting "the FERC's
consultation with the states that unsurprisingly revealed substantial opposition to RTOs
[Regional Transmission Organizations]"); Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/
Independent Systems Operators (ISO), FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp
[https://perma.cc/TPG7-DAKN]
(discussing the history of independent system operators and regional transmission organizations).
66. For example, most of the southeastern United States operates outside of organized
regional markets, as does most of the western United States, except California, which has its own
transmission operator. Regional Transmission Organizations, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N.
(Nov. 2015), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/elec-ovr-rto-map.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZQ59-SGAY] (showing geographic locations of RTOs); see also Shelley Welton, NonTransmission Alternatives, 39 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 477 (2015) (noting that "RTOs serve
approximately two-thirds of electricity customers, although their geographic coverage is more
limited").
67. FERC Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,845 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafterOrder No. 1000].
68. See Order No. 2000, supra note 17, at 813 (discussing the expansion of independent
generation).
69.

U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY xi (2002) (concluding

that the "U.S. transmission system facilitates wholesale electricity markets that lower consumers'
electricity bills by nearly $13 billion annually").
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state authority within the energy arena. Specifically, Congress deemed
federal regulation to protect the public interest a necessity, but in
granting FERC authority over interstate transmission and wholesale
sales of electricity Congress also provided that this authority "shall not
apply to any other sale of electric energy."7 0 This and other portions of
the FPA created a complex federalist scheme, preserving certain
authority previously held by states but encroaching upon some of their
regulatory turf. The regulatory regime that emerged impeded FERC's
market-based goals and in some cases left substantial regulatory gaps
that were supposed to have been filled by the FPA.
Due to the authority reserved to states under the FPA-namely,
the power to regulate retail sales -some states effectively blocked
federal efforts to make electricity generation and transmission truly
competitive, thus occupying an area that FERC, through its rate and
transmission-based orders, intended to leave open for competition. For
example, because states maintained jurisdiction over the siting of
power plants, the determination of whether a power plant should be
built, and the retail rates that the plant could charge, states sometimes
blocked the construction of new competitive generation that would
have supplied both wholesale and retail customers. 72 The exit intended
by FERC therefore became, against FERC's wishes, only partial exit,
creating a market substantially influenced by state forces, many of
which impeded competition.
Even in states that embraced competition, problems emerged in
the form of regulatory gaps. As Ruhl and Salzman note, Californiafollowing FERC's lead-decided to open up the electricity market for
both retail and wholesale generation by requiring monopolistic utilities
to divest their generation infrastructure. 73 All generation subsequently
had to be purchased and sold through a competitive power exchange
(PX). 74 All wholesale power sales occurred through the competitive PX
market, but as Ruhl and Salzman further observe, utilities purchasing
70. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012).
71. The FPA explicitly reserves to states the authority to regulate "any other sale" of energy
(apart from wholesale sales). Id.
72. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000) (finding that the
Florida Public Service Commission lacked the authority to approve the construction of a power
plant for which most power was not "committed" to Florida customers, thus allowing Florida to
block the construction the type of power plant encouraged by the federal government).
73. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1321-22; see also Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub.
Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 539 (2008) (describing California's
requirements).

74.

Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 539; Ruhi & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1321.
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market-based wholesale power still had to sell retail power at a rate
capped by the state." So when wholesale sellers (now largely
unregulated by FERC and allowed to charge market rates)
manipulated PX by, for example, creating artificial power scarcity and
inducing high wholesale prices, utilities had to purchase expensive
power and sell it at a low rate. When these utilities attempted to
remedy the economic harm through lawsuits alleging improper market
manipulation under state antitrust law, they found themselves trapped
between a rock and a hard place. Federal courts noted that FERC still
technically regulated wholesale electricity prices by issuing a permit for
utilities to sell at market-based rates.7 6 Thus, although the rates were
determined by market forces, they were officially approved by a
federal agency and could not be collaterally challenged through the
courts.77 Under this rule, called the "filed rate" doctrine," the only
remedy was to engage in FERC proceedings,7 9 which took years to
complete and did not allow for full recovery of losses. Ultimately,
during the disruptive crisis in the California electric power sector,
FERC failed in its statutory duties to protect the public interestparticularly in its duty to protect the public from unreasonable
electricity rates.
FERC's electricity restructuring initiative demonstrates both the
promise and peril of an exit strategy and the failures associated with a
regulatory exchange approach that lacks a model allowing for checks
on the inevitable failures that accompany exit. It sheds light on the
particular federalism challenges that arise when exit occurs within a
shared regulatory space, and it makes clear that rarely, if ever, will full
exit occur given agencies' ongoing statutory duties. The limits of
electricity restructuring also highlight the need for a proactive strategy
aimed at anticipating and facilitating hydraulic regulatory exchange
specifically, the need to foresee how states might fill in openings
created by federal regulatory transitions, or how the federal
government might reenter a regulatory space if it identifies market

75. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1322.
76. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Grays Harbor Cty. v. IDACORP, Inc., 379 F.3d 641,649-51 (9th
Cir. 2004) (describing FERC's market-based rates).
77. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 384 F.3d 756, 761
(9th Cir. 2004) ("This court has rejected Snohomish's argument that the preemption-related
doctrines at issue do not apply when market-based rates are involved.").
78. Id.
79. California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 837-39 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
that the claims were governed by ISO tariffs).
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problems or other challenges. And having anticipated these reactions,
discrete "offramp" strategies are likely needed.so These would include
carefully designed ex ante plans for exit that incorporate ongoing
regulatory protections against market failure and new regulatory gaps,
and that also anticipate increased demand for additional regulation by
the commission, states, or other governments. Such strategies would
better ensure that exit does not compromise an agency's statutory
responsibilities, as discussed in the following Section.
B.

Difficulties Fulfilling Statutory Duties in the Transition to Markets

The limitations of FERC's electricity restructuring efforts suggest
that, if FERC is to avoid creating new regulatory gaps, it needs a
clearer, more proactive strategy in approaching its exit from traditional
energy regulation. Given the FPA's continued requirement for an
assurance of "just and reasonable" rates (previously met through costof-service regulation), 1 FERC's modern market approach must ensure
that, in pursuing competitive markets through market-based rates, it
does not fall short of its responsibilities to ratepayers. It is likely
impossible for an agency to fully predict the pitfalls it will encounter
when exiting a particular form of regulation (in this case, conventional
rate regulation) and the specific backup authority it must retain to
prevent and respond to those pitfalls. These predictive difficulties
necessitate a sort of "bottom-up" approach that relies on checks and
balances at other levels of government as well as intra-agency exchange
to serve as backup insurance in the case of failure. But as this Part
discusses, certain problems can be addressed up front to balance exit
strategies with statutory duties, and under FERC's electricity
restructuring initiative, FERC did not plan for these contingencies as
much as it could have.
One of the clearest examples of the challenges of balancing exit
and ongoing regulatory duties arose in the context of wholesale
contracts for electricity, as addressed by the Supreme Court in Morgan

80. The roadmaps that we propose later in this Article are different from the mapped exit
strategies defined by Ruhl and Salzman, in which the government identifies particular thresholds
at which parties will or will not be subject to regulation. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 3, at 131619. We envision a more comprehensive plan that would define the ongoing role of regulatory
agencies at several levels of government and incorporate clearer consideration of federal
agencies' oversight responsibilities under federal statutes-responsibilities from which exit is not
an option.
81. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012). See supra note 10 for a description of the meaning of "just
and reasonable" rates.
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Stanley Capital Group v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish
County.' When FERC attempted to enhance competition in
generation prices by abandoning cost-of-service ratemaking for most
wholesale sales, the commission retained certain protective strategies.
For example, FERC still required each power marketer or generator
to obtain FERC approval to charge market-based rates,8 3 thus ensuring
ex ante review of potential anticompetitive problems. But for entities
that entered into private long-term contracts to sell power-contracts
called power purchase agreements (PPAs) -FERC's role was minimal.
A longstanding doctrine developed by the Supreme Court required
that FERC presume that these "freely negotiated" rates were just and
reasonable under the FPA." Challengers of wholesale rates contained
within these contracts could only overcome the presumption by
proving to FERC "that the contract seriously harm[ed] the public
interest.""

Some PPAs negotiated during the California restructuring crisis
contained unusually high rates-largely because the alternative rates
available through the power exchange were even higher.86 These PPAs
locked power purchasers into these rates for long periods, and the
purchasers challenged the rates as unjust and unreasonable, arguing
that the presumption should not apply to these PPAs." FERC
disagreed and refused to allow contract modification, but the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the purchasers, finding that the presumption
should not apply because FERC was unable to review the PPAs just
after they had been agreed to, and accordingly had lacked the
opportunity to determine that the prices in the contracts were not just
and reasonable due to "market dysfunctions."' Further, the lower
court concluded that even if the presumption did apply, when
purchasers-as opposed to sellers-of electricity challenge the prices,
the presumption of just and reasonable rates is easier to overcome.8 9
The Supreme Court disagreed with this reasoning but granted the

82. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527
(2008).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b).
84. This is known as the "Mobile-Sierra" doctrine. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 530
(referencing United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 539-41 (addressing problems in the spot market).
87. Id. at 541.
88. Id. at 543-44.
89. Id.
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purchasers relief on other grounds; in reviewing the contracts' impact
on the public interest, FERC had looked only to whether the prices
imposed an excessive burden at the time they went into effect, as
opposed to "down the line"-later time periods during which the
contract prices, as compared to other prices, looked excessive.9 0 The
Court concluded that FERC should have considered "the disparity
between the contract rate and the rates consumers would have paid
(but for the contracts) further down the line, when the open market
was no longer dysfunctional."9 1 Further, the Court reasoned that if
generators and power marketers were able to lock in a high contract
rate for wholesale power as a result of unlawful activity-that is, if
there was a direct causal connection between unlawful activity such as
market manipulation and the price-then the presumption is
inapplicable to that contract."
FERC's failure to address these sorts of problems ex ante, and its
initial denial of power purchasers' requests for relief in Morgan
Stanley, demonstrates the problems that arose due to the commission's
lack of clearly defined strategies for preserving statutorily mandated
consumer protections while exiting markets. Although FERC's effort
to increase competition in markets was laudable, the commission
certainly knew that market manipulation was still a threat-as
evidenced by FERC's ongoing requirement that it would individually
review each power marketer's and generator's proposal to operate
under a market-based tariff (in other words, to charge purchasers
whatever the market would bear). 93 But FERC lacked an adequately
detailed ex ante plan to address unjust and unreasonable rates that
arose from manipulation of competitive markets and the inevitable
spillover of these rates into privately negotiated long-term contracts.
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has still not ruled that FERC's
market-based rates are consistent with its mandate under the FPA,
raising a continuing concern that compliance with the commission's
statutory mandate will require it to be vigilant about these kinds of
consumer protection concerns.

90. Id. at 552.
91. Id. at 553.
92. Id. at 554-55.
93. Id. at 537 (describing FERC's requirement of an "initial authorization of a market-based
tariff" and the accompanying reporting requirements).
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III. COMPETITIVE MARKETS, PUBLIC GOODS, AND REGULATORY
EXCHANGE

FERC's efforts to exit conventional rate regulation while also
hewing to the commission's ongoing statutory duties produced many
legal tensions, as explored in Part II. More recently, as states have
addressed issues such as energy reliability and climate change, a new
series of conflicts between FERC and the states have emerged. Even
where FERC has embraced competitive wholesale energy markets,
these private markets often fail to fully address important public goods,
such as energy reliability and environmental protections.94
Stakeholders, including power suppliers, have increasingly sought state
assistance to advance these public goods.95 In this back-and-forth
between FERC and the states, regulatory exit is more commonly
intergovernmental exchange, and it is a complicated game with
multiple players. FERC's market initiatives might, at times, seem to
cede some authority to the states, allowing states to fill in potential
holes that remain in federal restructuring efforts. Yet sometimes,
FERC asserts or reasserts ongoing federal authority through the
courts, in the form of federal preemption, in an attempt to better
manage intergovernmental exchange. To date, this kind of exchange
has been reactive, leading to legal conflict and ad hoc, unprincipled
resolution, typically by courts. However, if federal regulators were
proactively attentive to hydraulic regulatory exchange in addressing
monopoly power in modern energy markets, they would be better
positioned to strike a balance between adaptation and flexibility in
their exit strategies.96

94. But see generally Jody Freeman, The Uncomfortable Convergence of Energy and
Environmental Law, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 339 (2017) (explaining how even in instances
when FERC has not listed environmental goals in describing its initiatives, some initiatives have
nonetheless had positive environmental results).
95. For a discussion of how FERC has sought to address reliability, see generally Hughes v.
Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). Against the backdrop of federal inaction on
climate change, states have focused on their own climate change initiatives. See, e.g., Renewable
Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY

(Feb. 2017), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.comlwp-content/uploads/2017/03/ RenewablePortfolio-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5X4-58RD] (showing state policies requiring
renewable energy-policies that are often linked to goals associated with reducing carbon
emissions).
96. We do not mean to suggest here that FERC was wholly inattentive to the likelihood that
its regulatory approach would sometimes bump up against the states or to argue that FERC
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Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases demonstrate how federal
regulators' ad hoc, unprincipled approach to regulatory exchange has
produced conflicts due to new forms of state regulation, despite
FERC's efforts to exit conventional energy rate regulation. These
disputes show how full exit is not something that FERC can easily
accomplish, especially where Congress has required that other
institutional concerns be balanced, as it did in its effort to close the
Attleboro gap in the FPA.97
These recent disputes also illustrate how the option of FERC
creating a wholesale power market that fully preempts state power
supply choices has failed on its own terms and is plagued by both legal
and policy difficulties. As regulatory approaches to energy markets
evolve, FERC and federal courts cannot merely assume that the
Attleboro gap will be closed by energy markets, as Order 888's initial
power market vision may have hoped. FERC's role as an interstate
market regulator provides important guidance to state regulators.
FERC can better promote market clarity and meet its statutory goal of
mitigating monopolistic abuses in energy markets by defining offramps
for states to exit competitive wholesale power market spheresproactively articulating when, and under what conditions, states may
pursue their own regulatory objectives outside of the wholesale power
market. In this sense, the most difficult issues with modern energy
market exit are not about FERC itself exiting competitive markets, as
much as they are about FERC allowing states and other institutions to
make decisions about power supply outside of energy markets. We
argue that this kind of exit by other institutions is best approached and
anticipated as a form of hydraulic intergovernmental regulatory
exchange-a reactive form of exit by others that federal regulators
must facilitate and manage to ensure that it does not produce new
forms of market power.

should have predicted the many conflicts that might arise as it asserted or retracted from certain
regulatory authority. But we think that greater ex ante attention to some of the most likely
conflicts-such as states' desire to regulate generation (including wholesale generation) for
environmental purposes could have eased some of the conflict that emerged in the courts. For a
discussion of FERC's tendency to avoid close consideration of the environmental impacts (or
justifications) for its policies-including in its policies relating to competitive wholesale rates and
open access transmission, see Freeman, supra note 94, at 366-71.
97. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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The Significance of ProvidingStates and Other Institutions Exit
Options

FERC's experience with demand response illustrates how a
proactive approach to exit strategies is necessary to avoid new
regulatory conflicts. Demand response is a practice through which
consumers of electricity reduce electricity use in response to higher
electricity prices or other signals, such as a request from a utility to
reduce demand during periods of peak generation." This type of
management of electricity use can substantially reduce electricity
prices; for example, if, a utility can structure rates so as to reduce
customer energy usage during peak times, it may not be as necessary
to draw on expensive new peak generation to satisfy demand for
electricity, and demand response provides an energy consumer
compensation if it can guarantee this type of valuable service.99
In another approach that expands (rather than contracts) certain
types of federal regulation, FERC has attempted to further enhance
competition in wholesale electricity markets-beyond encouraging
independent generation through the opening up of transmission
lines-by incentivizing entities to bid demand response resources into
wholesale electricity markets. For example, companies called
"aggregators" can approach numerous electricity consumers and
persuade them to agree to reduce their electricity use when called upon
to do so; an aggregator can bid this demand response resource into
wholesale electricity markets, creating value by reducing the need for
certain expensive peak generation within these markets." FERC
incentivized this type of practice through several orders, including
Order 719, which mandated utilities' acceptance of demand response
bids from aggregators, and Order 745, which ensured that demand
response bidders would be compensated for the valuable services they
were providing.101 Both orders, however, allowed for a sort of state
"veto" by permitting states to block consumers from selling demand

98. See Joel B. Eisen, Demand Response's Three Generations: Market Pathways and
Challenges in the Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 351 (2017).
99. See, e.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 771-72 (2016)
(describing the net benefits test in FERC Order 745 and how it ensures that only demand response
resources that are cheaper than generation are accepted in energy markets).
100. See, e.g., Michael Gallagher, Demand Response Aggregators and the MISO Wholesale
Markets: A Survey of State Laws, 47 ENvTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11065, 11071-72 (2017)
(noting that "aggregators organize consumers as a group and bid into RTO wholesale markets").
101. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 770-72 (2016) (describing the orders).
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response resources in FERC-enabled wholesale markets.102
In 2016, the Supreme Court addressed and reversed a D.C. Circuit
opinion that vacated Order 745.103 Among other reasons for reversal,
the court of appeals had determined that FERC's federal jurisdiction
under the FPA did not extend to demand response resources, which
are essential retail resources subject to state jurisdiction." The
Supreme Court disagreed in FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass'n
(EPSA),' 5 concluding that FERC's jurisdiction over "all rules and
regulations affecting or pertaining to [wholesale] rates or charges"an authority called "affecting" jurisdiction-covered demand response
resources.'" The Court observed that through Order 745, FERC was
simply regulating "what takes place on the wholesale market"
allowing consumers to sell a cost-competitive electricity resource
within these markets.107 Further, the Court emphasized that the
markets into which demand response resources are bid are run entirely
by "[w]holesale market operators," and that the express aim of FERC's
demand response program was to "improve[] the wholesale market,"
encouraging more competition in lower prices.108 Thus, although
FERC's order happened to affect state-regulated retail rates, this did
not serve as a bar to federal regulation of how demand response
resources are priced in the wholesale power market.1 09
Another central aspect of the Court's reasoning in EPSA was the
FPA's initial purpose of filling the Attleboro gap in which neither state
nor federal regulators regulated wholesale rates. In recognizing
FERC's jurisdiction over demand response, the Court noted that states
alone would not be permitted by the FPA to regulate demand response
bids within wholesale markets.110 By contrast, if the Court had followed
the reasoning of those opposed to Order 745, it would have invalidated
federal control over these bids, thus creating the very sort of gap that
the FPA was intended to avoid.'
A practical consequence of EPSA's focus on this statutory
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 779-80.
at 772-73 (reversing Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (2014)).
at 772.
at 760.
at 773-75.
at 776.
at 776-77.
at 776.
at 780.
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purpose of closing regulatory gaps in the regulation of market power is
the creation of a relatively flexible regulatory space that recognizes a
significant sphere of concurrent federal and state authority. In
affirming FERC's authority to regulate demand response prices in the
wholesale market, while also recognizing states' authority over retail
aspects of demand response, the Court validated a regime that allows
the federal government to engage in constrained exit. The Court's
decision allowed for considerable reliance on competitive power
markets, while also acknowledging the need to regulate the markets in
which this competition occurs; moreover, the Court recognized how
federal law leaves states considerable leeway to experiment with
competitive resources like demand response as they make their own
power supply choices.1 12
B. Managing HydraulicExchange with State Regulators
Simply providing states the option to exit the federal system for
purposes of experimentation-a common trope of federalism-does
not fully capture the complexities of modern regulation, especially in
the electric power sector. With cooperative or dynamic federalism
emerging as a new norm in energy regulation,113 in which concurrent
spheres of regulation are common, it is important for federal regulators
to manage forms of state exit in order to ensure that federal energy
market strategies accommodate state policies aimed at ensuring
reliable and environmentally responsible approaches to power supply
and to reduce (and ideally eliminate) dysfunctional conflict.
One novel strategy FERC has used to help grease the wheels of
regulatory exchange without entirely relinquishing its authority over
basic substantive policy issues is the state opt out or policy veto. In
recognizing FERC's demand response approach as a "program of
cooperative federalism," the Court noted that FERC's rules "allow[]
any State regulator to prohibit its consumers from making demand
response bids in the wholesale market," thus giving states "the means
to block whatever 'effective' increases in retail rates demand response
112. Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEx. L. REV. 399, 436-37
(2016).
113. As noted above, we use "cooperative" federalism in a loose sense here. See supranote 9.
Within the more traditional form of cooperative federalism, such as under the Clean Air Act,
California is allowed to regulate motor vehicle emissions more stringently than federal standards
if it receives a "waiver" from the EPA. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate
Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (2009) (discussing the waiver and other aspects of the
Clean Air Act).

1714

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1687

programs might be thought to produce."11 4 This "opt out" or "veto"
option would appear to envision FERC setting basic expectations for
demand response resources in wholesale markets while still allowing
state regulators an opportunity to experiment with a wide range of
complementary approaches to power supply that promote energy
conservation and also protect retail customers. Because states retain
authority over retail rates, which are fundamental to retail customer
demand response, states have been able to pursue a diverse range of
policy experiments with energy conservation and efficiency. This
"bottom-up" approach has allowed demand response resources to
develop while also enabling markets and regulators (both federal and
state) to learn about the viability of various retail customer demand
response initiatives. The Court did not reason that the state veto option
(providing each state its own "offramp" from federal market policies)
is required by the FPA or necessary to support any federal regulation
of state barriers to demand response as a practice affecting wholesale
markets. Still, the Court considered the state veto option an important
component of FERC's demand response rules that helped to soften the
impact of an expansion of federal regulatory authority over demand
response pricing while also recognizing a continued state role over
power supply.
We think that the notion of a state veto over energy resource
participation in federal power markets is a powerful tool for federal
regulators in approaching other issues where states are experimenting
with policies regarding power supply decisions. By permitting retail
customers, who are subject to state jurisdiction, to essentially
circumvent state jurisdiction and opt for participation in competitive
wholesale markets instead-unless a state has prohibited this
outright-FERC empowered customers themselves to make the
decision to exit traditional forms of state regulation and to participate
in new demand response markets. The kind of veto option helped
mitigate market power and supported state buy-in by allowing states
to prohibit retail customers from participating in these federally run
demand response markets, thus choosing to exit FERC's market
policies.
Much of the regulatory veto literature tends to cast a wary eye on
vetoes as creating holdout problems, and indeed, the veto has some
important limitations, which are flagged below. However, partial exit
from a regulatory task-here requiring participation in demand
114.

EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779-80.
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response markets-can allow other institutions (such as states) some
meaningful input in policies that help to mitigate market power. The
state veto option over demand response appears to have been a key
proactive measure taken in FERC's effort to partially exit regulated
wholesale markets and further encourage competition in these
markets. States are often considered to be laboratories of democracy,1
but federal regulators themselves can learn from the diversity of
different states' approaches.116 As important, having some buy-in from
states as partners can also help federal regulators mediate the
hydraulics of regulatory exchange in a manner that avoids outright
preemption and also minimizes the risk of regulatory backlash from
states.
This is not the first time that FERC has given states options about
how they wish to participate in interstate energy markets as a way of
getting more buy-in from them and learning from their experiments.
Through an earlier series of orders, FERC incentivized utilities to hand
over control of their transmission lines to regional organizations,11 7 and
most recently, FERC required states and the utilities regulated by
states to engage in regional planning to address the need for new
electricity transmission lines."' In a field like energy law, in which the
federal government and states operate within a shared, sometimes
ambiguous, and often contested119 jurisdictional space, incorporating
these kinds of vetoes into exit from certain forms of regulation can
serve as the type of compromise that allows for effective partial exit
with continued, limited federal oversight and state buy-in.
This veto option powerfully demonstrates the importance of
FERC's anticipation of concurrent state regulation in its market
initiatives. But the FPA's federalism balance also presents complicated
new issues not fully addressed by the veto option crafted by FERC-

115. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratoriesof Democracy? Policy Innovation in
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1351, 1335-37 (2009) (describing this common
assumption found within court cases and the scholarly literature).
116. Cf Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, FederalLaboratoriesof Democracy, U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (describing how the federal government often initiates experiments
or works with states to carry out experiments and can learn from the diversity of policy
approaches tried at different governmental levels).
117. Order No. 2000, supra note 17, at 831; Order No. 888, supranote 13, at 21,551.
118. Order No. 1000, supra note 67, at 49,845.
119. For recent cases debating federal and state authority over electricity regulations, see
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016), and Hughes v. Talen Energy
Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016), along with the ongoing litigation about state policies discussed
infra.
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specifically, to what extent can state regulators "exit" or opt out of
interstate energy markets in ways that promote new forms of
monopolistic abuses or impede FERC's goal of enhancing competition
in energy markets? To what extent can state exit be inconsistent with
the FPA's aim of closing the Attleboro gap in the regulation of energy
markets?
Without doubt, there are instances where reactive regulatory
exchange has facilitated continued monopolization of energy supply
and parochial forms of protectionism, which has likely helped to
sustain higher electricity prices. For example, in the context of
transmission planning, though FERC has solicited input from states,
states still may choose the type of planning process involved and design
this process. As some commenters have observed, this allows some
states to essentially avoid regional planning and largely maintain the
status quo.12 0 Yet the FPA recognizes that there must be some limit on
how far a state can go when it wishes to opt out of federal market
policies aimed at mitigating market power. For example, it would seem
that no state can outright prohibit a power supplier with market power
from selling into the wholesale market, as this would encroach on
FERC's jurisdiction to mitigate monopolistic abuses in the wholesale
power market. Some states have come perilously close to this kind of
encroachment by narrowly construing their jurisdiction over the
construction of power plants that produce both retail and wholesale
electricity. For example, Florida's Supreme Court has held that its
siting statute, which requires a need finding prior to building a new
power plant, does not allow the construction of a plant by an out-ofstate developer that would have sold some of its electricity to
customers in Florida but might have potentially sold additional
wholesale electricity across state lines.1 2 1 Similarly, in the approval of
new electric power transmission lines, some states favor in-state or
incumbent utilities in the approval process. 22 Perhaps the ultimate
solution to these problems is for FERC to preempt all protectionist
state initiatives that promote monopolistic discrimination in wholesale
power markets.1 2 ' However, short of a controversial (and legally
120. See, e.g., Welton, supra note 66, at 461-62 (noting that regional and local planners are
only making "vague promises" with respect to certain Order No. 1000 directives).
121. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 434 (Fla. 2000).
122. Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for
Interstate Coordination,100 MINN. L. REv. 129, 189-97 (2015).
123. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. This approach presents some important
federalism tradeoffs: It would turn a cooperative federalism program into a unitary preemption
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questionable) assertion of preemptive authority over all state
regulation of power generation, the veto option has allowed ambitious
federal policies that help open up markets to mitigate market power
and reduce electricity prices without limiting state experimentation.
Veto likely will offer similar promise in emerging areas of energy law
such as energy storage, where jurisdictional space is once again quite
uncertain. 12 4
Even if states do not exit federal regulatory market power
mitigation approaches outright, as FERC has transitioned to
competitive interstate markets, energy industry stakeholders
increasingly are looking to states and other institutions to provide for
important public goods that these markets leave unaddressed. At some
level, these new forms of state intervention may interfere with pricing
signals in competitive markets, and some calls for preemption of states'
reactive exit have focused on whether the incentives or subsidies
interfere with or impact a wholesale rate.125 However, these state
initiatives can also help to produce undersupplied public goods and can
mitigate market power by removing barriers to entry and promoting
new forms of power supply. In this sense, we think that an
understanding of exit aimed at mitigating market power in electric
power supply can help to elucidate why it is important for courts and
FERC to give states considerable leeway to adopt their own reactive
forms of exit, rather than preempt them outright,
The Supreme Court's 2016 decision in Hughes v. Talen Energy
Marketing1 2 6 demonstrates the delicate balance that must be struck as
stakeholders seek new forms of state regulation as a type of hydraulic

program, moving the federalism approach of the FPA from quadrant 4 to quadrant 2.
124. For discussion of regulatory uncertainty in the area of energy storage, see Amy L. Stein,
ReconsideringRegulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
697 (2014). FERC recently adopted a new rule designed to incorporate the participation of energy
storage in wholesale power markets. FERC Order No. 841, Electric Storage Participation in
Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators,
83 Fed. Reg. 9580 (Mar. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). However, as with demand
response, energy storage policies and incentives will depend heavily on state regulators. See Peter
Maloney, The Flip Side of FERC's Landmark Storage Order: A Call for States to Take Action,
UTL. DIVE (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-flip-side-of-fercs-landmarkstorage-order-a-call-for-states-to-take-a/518497/ [https://perma.cc/AK8N-JSYT].
125. See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016) (indicating
that a previous case makes "clear that States [impermissibly] interfere with FERC's authority by
disregarding interstate wholesale rates FERC has deemed just and reasonable").
126. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). New Jersey attempted a
similar approach, which the Third Circuit invalidated in PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766
F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
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relief (or exit) from FERC-regulated competitive energy markets.
Hughes held that a Maryland scheme to compensate the construction
of new natural gas plants to improve customer reliability is preempted
under the FPA.127 Perceiving the regional market incentives in PJM (a
regional market in which Maryland utilities voluntarily participate) as
insufficient to incentivize new construction within its borders,
Maryland enacted a scheme whereby gas power plant owners would be
compensated with a fixed revenue stream for capacity that cleared the
relevant market.128 In other words, compensation was designed to
provide more revenue for the plant's owners than they would have
received in PJM's capacity market, which FERC had approved.129
Because Maryland's auction for new in-state generation interfered
with FERC's exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale sales of
energy under the FPA, in Hughes the Court upheld a lower court
determination that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
preempts the Maryland scheme.130 Under the FPA, "FERC has
approved" the regional "capacity auction as the sole [rate setting]
mechanism for sales of capacity" in order to mitigate market power in
the region, and, pursuant to PJM's auction, FERC "has deemed the
clearing price per se just and reasonable."1 31 Given this comprehensive
measure to mitigate market power in the capacity market, Maryland
was thus preempted from adopting a plan for new power generation
that provided subsidies that, in effect, set a different wholesale price by
guaranteeing a select power generator a rate through a 20 yearcontract with the state's incumbent utilities.132 This kind of
arrangement interfered with FERC's effort to address market power
through the capacity market, particularly given that Maryland had
authorized its utilities to participate in a FERC-approved wholesale
energy supply market and to price and compensate capacity on this
basis, rather than in some other manner.
The Court's Hughes decision has left many regulators, lawyers,
and industry stakeholders puzzled.' 33 At the extreme, litigants
127. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1290.
128. Id. at 1293.
129. Id. Maryland is one of thirteen states that have authorized their utilities to operate in
PJM-a regional transmission organization that operates the largest organized wholesale power
market in the United States.
130. Id. at 1299.
131. Id. at 1297.
132. Id.
133. E.g., Emily Hammond, Response, Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC: Energy
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challenging state initiatives have read Hughes as grounding
preemption of state initiatives on whether they target or interfere with
wholesale prices. Hughes may support an expansive view of
preemption, insofar as the Court noted that states may not tether
revenues to wholesale market participation or condition payments on
capacity clearing the relevant capacity market auction.134 However,
since the Court expressly emphasized the narrowness of its holding,13 5
Hughes' reach also appears to be limited by its facts. The Court was
particularly careful not to endorse blanket preemption by FERC of all
state incentives and subsidies based on an idealized competitive
wholesale power market. It fell short of concluding that every state
subsidy or incentive for power supply is preempted because it impacts
or undermines a wholesale energy price. The decision expressly left
open "the permissibility of various other measures States might employ
to encourage development of new or clean generation, including tax
incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned
generation facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector." 13 6
At its most fundamental level, Hughes would seem to prohibit
state regulators from adopting investment incentives for power supply
that directly target federal wholesale power market participation in
ways that enable an incumbent utility or energy resource to expand its
market power despite federal mitigation efforts through wholesale
markets, as the Maryland capacity incentives arguably may have.137
New state incentives or subsidies for power supply that create market
power might invite states to bolster incumbent firms or give favorable
treatment to local resources with market power over out-of-state
sources. This can lead to distortions in energy price signals. However,
we do not believe that it is simple distortion of wholesale markets that
creates a preemption problem under Hughes. Rather, it is state
intervention that risks undue discrimination associated with monopoly
power by incumbent power suppliers without any regulatory oversight.
Consistent with this reading of Hughes, FERC's initial response to the
decision indicated some hostility toward state-supported cost recovery
Law's JurisdictionalBoundaries-Take Three, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (Apr. 22, 2016),
http://www.gwlr.org/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc-energy-laws-j urisdictional-boundariestake-three/ [https://perma.cc/ZG5J-HFHG].
134. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
135. Id ("Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland's program only because it disregards an
interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.").
136. Id.
137. See id.

1720

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1687

for legacy coal or nuclear plants that are no longer competitive in
regional wholesale power markets operating under rules similar to
those of PJM in Maryland.'
The emphasis on whether someone-the federal government or
the state-is mitigating market power seems important in the Hughes
context, as states can still opt to not participate in regional energy
markets and to address market power issues themselves through
conventional rate regulation. In this sense, states continue to hold a
stealth exit option of their own-one that allows them to pursue
reliability goals, like Maryland's, and other values that wholesale
markets do not sufficiently price, such as enhancing reliance on lowcarbon power. Traditionally regulated states such as Georgia and
South Carolina offer significant subsidies for new nuclear and carbon
capture projects, without running into any preemption challenge under
federal law; these incentives are not likely to be invalidated on
preemption grounds because states in the southeastern United States
do not operate within competitive wholesale markets like PJM, nor
have they restructured at the retail level.139 Unlike Maryland,
therefore, these states have retained their full authority to decide what
values to pursue and compensate, while also continuing to protect
consumers. Although wholesale costs must be carried forward into
state rate-making proceedings, 4 0 these states still retain the authority
to set each utility's return on investment. Moreover, the wholesale
costs in these states are not derived from competitive auctions, but
rather from bilateral contracts.1 4' In these states, therefore, providing
compensation for the costs of power project construction does not
"second-guess" or "disregard[] [an] interstate wholesale rate[] FERC
has deemed just and reasonable" for purposes of mitigating market
power.'4 2 Thus, in contrast to the regional capacity market governing
Maryland utilities that FERC had approved, retail reliability (and the
need for new power supply capacity) in many other parts of the country

138. See John Funk, FERC Rejects PUCO-Approved FirstEnergy, AEP Power Deals, PLAIN
DEALER (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2016/04/ferc-rejects
(describing FERC's rejection of
puco-approval-of.html [https://perma.cc/6AYW-6AYR]
monthly surcharges aimed at protecting existing coal and nuclear plants from competitive
markets).
139. Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contractin the Marketplace, 69
VAND. L. REV. 141,209 (2016).
140. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 961 (1986).
141. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 139, at 154.
142. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298-99.

2018]

CONSTRAINED REGULATORY EXIT

1721

remains solidly within the wheelhouse of state regulators and is not
priced in the interstate wholesale market. 143 Too broad of a reading of
Hughes could thus create hydraulic incentives for states to re-regulate
as they address the social project of grid decarbonization.
For the remaining two-thirds of the United States, wholesale
electricity sales occur within organized competitive markets such as
PJM, which are more comprehensively regulated through FERC's
approval and oversight of regional market tariffs.1 " In these areas, we
believe that the application of Hughes to state incentives and policies
must be approached with attention to the purpose behind the state
intervention, as well as its impact on market power. Absent any
effective market price on carbon such as a national carbon tax, regional
initiatives, including PJM's capacity market, fail entirely to price the
carbon attributes of various sources of energy. 145 As Justice Ginsburg
wrote for the Hughes majority, "We reject Maryland's program only
because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by
FERC." 146 This would appear to leave states-even those in organized
regional markets-considerable flexibility to adopt power supply
incentives and subsidies that advance other values beyond what is
reflected in FERC-approved market prices.1 47 Even if FERC-approved
regional energy markets envision wholesale prices being set in a certain
manner, state regulatory measures that aim to promote clean forms of
power generation -especially those with fewer carbon emissionsmay therefore be able to coexist with FERC's regulation of wholesale
power markets, as long as they do not enhance market power. The
basic preemption concern of Hughes should only really come into to

143. Even where, as in PJM, capacity markets provide some reliability pricing in the wholesale
market, it is not clear that they provide a perfect market valuation of reliability values associated
with different energy resources. The American Public Power Association, for example, has
highlighted how long-term contracts provide a superior way of promoting reliability in
comparison to capacity markets, and how capacity markets can result in different reliability
pricing based on how a state chooses to address its retail market. See Randy Elliott, Staying Power
of a Bad Idea: Capacity Markets' Reliability PricingMechanism, AM. PUB. POWER ASS'N (Sept.
8, 2015), http://blog.publicpower.org/sme/?p=761 [https://perma.cc/XM2L-E7LF].
144. See Overview, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/
mkt-electric/overview.asp [https://perma.cc/26RU-8RU8] (noting that two-thirds of the nation's
electricity load is served by organized regional markets).
145. Hammond & Spence, supra note 139, at 174, 212.
146. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
147. Id. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence also underscored "the importance of protecting the
States' ability to contribute, within their regulatory domain, to the Federal Power Act's goal of
ensuring a sustainable supply of efficient and price-effective energy." Id. at 1300 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
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play where the state incentives or subsidies are presenting a market
power problem that facilitate discrimination in bulk power pricing,
which is within the scope of FERC's authority to regulate just and
reasonable pricing.1
Such a reading of Hughes leaves states considerable space to fill in
public good gaps that FERC-regulated interstate power markets do not
address, so long as states do not themselves produce new wholesale
market power problems. As Hughes reminds us, such efforts cannot be
motivated by or target a FERC-approved pricing scheme designed to
mitigate market power in wholesale energy sales, such as the capacity
market operated by PJM. But to the extent that state regulators adopt
incentives or subsidies that take aim at legitimate regulatory objectives,
such as reliability or environmental protection, without targeting
federal pricing efforts aimed at mitigating market power, state
regulators are exercising legitimate control over power generation
policies. It is thus consistent with Hughes's preemption analysis for
states to compensate energy resources differently, even through
subsidies.
Consistent with this approach, to date federal courts have
recognized that states retain considerable leeway to pursue their own
regulatory policies so long as their subsidies do not aim directly at
wholesale prices. One post-Hughes challenge targeted the N.Y. Public
Service Commission (NYPSC) Clean Energy Standard, which, among
other things, compensates upstate merchant nuclear power plants for
the social cost of carbon that their electricity generation avoids.149 This
Zero Emission Credit approach provides nuclear plant operators
payments equivalent to the social cost of carbon (with small
adjustments) for the first two-year period of the Credit.5 0 To the extent
148. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
149. N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, ORDER ADOPTING A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD 1 (2016),
http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefld={44C5D5B8-14C34F32-8399-F5487D6D8FE8) [https://perma.cc/JPH2-RKLF]. In adopting this approach, New
York regulators rejected earlier proposals that were much more closely tied with wholesale
revenues. See Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead, and What
Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 3,15-16 (2017) [hereinafter Eisen, Dual
Electricity Federalism].
150. N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 149, at 51. This is a "Zero Emission Credit"
approach because nuclear power plants do not emit carbon (aside from lifecycle emissions
associated with mining for and transporting uranium, among other parts of the fuel cycle). See
NATL.

RENEWABLE ENERGY

LAB.,

LIFE CYCLE GREENHOUSE

GAS EMISSIONS FROM

ELECTRICITY GENERATION 2 (2013), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl3osti/57187.pdf (describing
relatively low life-cycle carbon emissions from nuclear energy). By paying these plants for the
social cost of carbon the state supports the plants monetarily and helps them to stay in business
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that this approach does not limit wholesale market participation or
calculate incentives based on the wholesale price of energy, it would
appear to fall on the "safe" side of Hughes. The NYPSC was careful to
note that it was not setting a price floor for nuclear power, and that any
adjustments to prices are for purposes of consumer protection."'1 In
later years, though, there are some price adjustments for wholesale
energy and capacity market revenuesl5 2 that would seem to face
uncertainty under an expansive reading of Hughes's preemption
analysis.153 Despite these legal concerns, a federal district court rejected
a preemption challenge to the New York Zero Emission Credit, noting
that the challengers failed to distinguish the program from renewable
energy credits that FERC had approved under the FPA.154 A challenge
to a similar Illinois program providing for zero emission credits based
on carbon price (featuring discounts based on wholesale prices to
protect consumers) was also rejected on the grounds that it is not
inconsistent with any existing FERC policy."
The ultimate outcome of these disputes surrounding state
subsidies remains uncertain as the issue is appealed, but we believe that
evaluating them with respect to their impacts on wholesale market
power mitigation would leave states considerable, but not unlimited,
leeway to address grid decarbonization, even in FERC-regulated,
organized markets. States can exit regional markets entirely to the
extent that they refuse to participate in coordinated markets and
continue to set retail rates, though they still must pass through
reasonable wholesale power purchase costs. Even when a state's
utilities participate in FERC-regulated regional markets, under the
recent readings of Hughes, states could also opt to provide public goods
that FERC has not priced in its general market policies or in market
despite their high costs relative to alternatives such as natural gas and renewable energy sources.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW
GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018 5, https://www.eia.gov/

outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity-generation.pdf [http://perma.cc/FUA6-95BK] (showing relatively
high costs of nuclear energy).
151. N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, supra note 149, at 139.
152. Id. at 51.
153. For further analysis, see Eisen, Dual ElectricityFederalism,supra note 149, at 9.
154. Coal. for Competitive Energy, Dynegy Inc. v. Zibelman, No. 16-CV-8164 (VEC), 2017
WL 3172866, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017) (rejecting challenge to New York's zero emission
credit program on the grounds that challengers had failed to distinguish the program from
renewable energy credits, which FERC had approved under the FPA).
155. See Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, Nos. 17 CV 1163 & 17 CV 1164,2017 WL 3008289, at
*14 (N.D. Ill. July 14,2017) (rejecting preemption clause challenge to Illinois zero emission credits
for nuclear plants on the grounds that there is no conflict with any existing FERC policy).
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tariffs that it has approved, so long as they do not undermine a FERC's
market power mitigation efforts. On this view, it would be permissible
for these state subsidies to influence wholesale prices to some degree
(as does every form of state regulation), so long as states neither
condition the subsidies on a supplier's participation in wholesale power
markets, nor base the subsidies solely on a competitive wholesale price
aimed at mitigating market power. The key inquiry is not whether a
subsidy merely interferes with a market price in the wholesale market;
rather, it is whether the subsidy promotes market power in a manner
that conflicts with federal initiatives to mitigate market power through
interstate power markets. Ultimately, answering this kind of question
to favor preemption of a state initiative aimed at power supply would
require FERC to make a finding that discrimination exists in wholesale
markets, which will depend on the characteristics of different energy
resources as well as regional markets.
With ongoing litigation, there remains uncertainty for states
wishing to pursue particular policies, including incentives and subsidies
to promote clean energy. Courts may never be able to eliminate all of
this uncertainty, as no jurisdictional test can resolve every fact
scenario. 116 Nevertheless, FERC can help to reduce some of the
uncertainty with its own policies by clarifying which FERC approvals
are aimed at mitigating market power and also clarifying when the
commission intends for states to continue to adopt their own initiatives
to address discrimination in power supply markets. For example,
FERC could adopt guidelines that identify forms of states' existing
market power mitigation approaches or those that, as a policy matter,
FERC considers most desirable. By providing greater clarity, FERC
could better anticipate and manage the pressures for regulatory
exchange as states pursue their own market power mitigation and grid
decarbonization initiatives through reactive forms of exit from
wholesale markets.
FERC could encourage hydraulic regulatory exchange by
clarifying that wholesale market prices are not the exclusive gauge by
which state initiatives will be judged. The recent federal district court
decision rejecting a preemption challenge to Illinois's incentives for
zero enission energy resources reasoned that there was no conflict
with existing FERC policies, even though these might impact
wholesale prices."' FERC's promotion of wholesale markets was
156.
157.

For criticism of court-led preemption approaches, see Rossi, supra note 112.
Vill. of Old Mill Creek, 2017 WL 3008289 at *14.
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designed to mitigate market power in power supply, but because it also
leaves both power supply decisions and retail rates to states, it is
important to recognize how the regulatory gaps (first identified in
Attleboro) that motivated adoption of the FPA abound in modern
wholesale markets. As with demand response, FERC would appear to
have a range of options that allows for sharing lanes with state
regulators as they find new ways to incentivize clean energy resources:
Namely, it can recognize acceptable forms of state hydraulic
exchange-perhaps through the option of a policy statement
identifying permissible forms of state subsidies-while also
encouraging states to participate in wholesale markets as partners in
mitigating market power. Absent some proactive approach by FERC,
however, it would appear that states seeking to address problems not
priced into wholesale power markets such as climate change continue
to retain some significant "exit" options of their own-that is, the
ability to opt out of fully competitive markets envisioned by FERC.
For example, states substantially influence the types of new generation
built through renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which require a
certain percentage or amount of retail electricity to come from
renewable sources. This sort of mandate for retail generation can
impact the types of generation built to serve both wholesale and retail
customers and is unlikely to present any market power problem at
all.158
At least in the energy context, exit is not a one-way strategy that
federal regulators monopolize. Framing state responses as examples of
hydraulic exchange is important if regulators are to be attentive to the
potential for regulatory gaps in mitigating market power in wholesale
power supply markets. Because of the cooperative federalism design
of the FPA, states and market participants have exit options too, and
federal regulators need to design their own exit strategies with this
possibility in mind.
CONCLUSION

Our case study of FERC's effort to exit traditionally regulated
energy markets shows that, at some level, there are both legal and

158. RPS affect utility decisions in terms of which type of generation to build in part because
compliance with RPS is achieved through the generation of a "renewable energy credit" (REC).
See Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REv. 1621, 1631 (2015) (noting that
"[i]ndependent power producers can sell their RECs to utilities to earn a premium on top of their
income from power sales in the wholesale electricity market").
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political economy limits on how far federal regulators can go in exiting
conventional energy regulation aimed at addressing market power. At
some basic level, the law requires continued regulatory vigilance over
pricing arrangements or other initiatives that promote market power,
so pure exit typically is not a strategy available to federal regulators,
and intra-agency exchange-in which deregulation in one sphere
accompanies enhanced regulation in another-is often the norm.
Moreover, given the complex federalism backdrop of utility regulation,
which creates another constraint on pure exit, the forms of exit that
occur in energy law look much more like regulatory exchange, adding
further nuance to adaptive exit. Federal regulators operating in such a
context generally cannot exit conventional regulation without
expecting hydraulic reactions by other institutions that can step in with
their own substitute initiatives to provide the public goods formerly
provided through federal regulation. The FPA would appear to allow
states substantial leeway where FERC is not already regulating an
activity, but FERC also needs to monitor these reactions to ensure that
they do not create new forms of market power.
Unlike the Endangered Species Act-the rich point of departure
for Ruhl & Salzman's insightful assessment of regulatory exit-not all
federal statutes allow agencies leeway to fully exit their traditional
regulatory missions. 15 9 Cooperative federalism" statutes such as the
FPA-which recognize institutions with overlapping regulatory
authority-may be poor candidates for pure exit, though they may
allow constrained forms of exit for some regulatory tasks. Study of the
transition to competitive energy markets as a form of exit also
underscores the significance of paying attention to hydraulic regulatory
exchange during regulatory transitions, including efforts to exit
conventional regulation. As the potential for regulatory overlap
expands, one agency's exit strategies will create new pressures for other
institutions, such as states and regional transmission organizations, to
intervene. Regulators operating under statutes that recognize shared
jurisdictional areas therefore need to anticipate and facilitate
regulatory exchange in their exit strategies, and acknowledge how
exchange connects to their statutory constraints and regulatory
objectives. This is not a new problem, and it is certainly not unique to

159. See Ruhi & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1319 ("A rare example among regulatory statutes,
the very purpose of the [Endangered Species Act] is to put itself out of business by promoting the
recovery of listed species to the point of justifying delisting.").
160. Again, we use cooperative federalism in the loose sense. See supra note 9.
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energy law. Professor William Buzbee, for example, has recognized
how some environmental statutes can create new forms of regulatory
gaps that are at odds with their goals."'1 Complex and overlapping
jurisdiction may heighten the need for agency initiatives that anticipate
and facilitate regulatory exchange as a pragmatic solution to better
manage other institutions. We think that mechanisms such as a veto,
which engages other institutions (namely states) in federal exit
initiatives, is one way to help create a balance between entrenchment
and flexibility in regulatory exchange. And the experience of energy
regulation with this approach shows some promise in striking such a
balance-and that, in the context of statutes such as the FPA, which
are aimed at filling regulatory gaps, addressing or anticipating
hydraulic regulatory exchange may even be required as a way of
mitigating market power in energy supply.
In adopting regulatory exchange strategies, agencies must also be
mindful of how overlapping regulators can create new market power
problems. Regulatory exchange might encourage dysfunctional
behaviors -such as selective disclosure of information or lobbying by
private entities-and it could lead to protectionism or dysfunctional
clashes between different regulators. These are certainly risks, though
a failure to acknowledge exchange in exit strategies increases the risks
of strategic disclosure, lobbying, or dysfunctional competition for
regulation. In addition, at some level, giving other institutions too
much of a voice can be obstructive or could lead to situations in which
other institutions overwhelmingly reject the approach of federal
regulators. This is something that might be managed to the extent that
federal regulators give other institutions a voice through mechanisms
such as a veto and use this as an information-gathering device that
allows the federal government to learn from these experiences,
influencing the course of federal policies in the future. For example,
FERC has done this with demand responsel62 and in its approach to
transmission planning, which requires regional energy market
operators to take into account state public policy objectives including
renewable power requirements in planning for new transmission
facilities.163 In this sense, hydraulic regulatory exchange thus not only
161. See generally William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1 (2003) (focusing on the need for a way to address regulatory
gaps in environmental enforcement under cooperative federalism statutes).
162. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing FERC learning from state demand
response initiatives).
163. FERC Order No. 1000, supra note 67, at 49,845-46 (requiring transmission planning

1728

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1687

gives a voice to other institutions but produces valuable information
for federal regulators, as well as markets, that can help in mitigating
market power.
Ruhl and Salzman are correct to warn against pure exit as a way
of dismantling energy regulation and to recommend adaptive exit as a
strategy for energy markets." Ultimately, however, we might question
whether the regulatory transition in energy markets is a form of exit at
all. Energy markets were created for an interventionist reason-to
mitigate market power-and need regulation to succeed. Exit from
traditional regulation might be justified where it works to mitigate
market power, but in other contexts exit may not be consistent with the
goals of modern energy markets. Importantly too, the notion that there
is a single regulator in modern energy markets is a myth. Exiting one
evil can readily open up the possibility of another one, including the
possibilities for new forms of exit that (often unintentionally) increase
rather than mitigate market power. As federal agencies exit some of
their traditional regulatory tasks, they must also devise strategies to
strike a new regulatory balance as stakeholders demand new forms of
regulation to fill in the void. At bottom, hydraulic regulatory exchange
in the context of the federal transition to competitive energy markets
shows how some government decisions that can be described as
regulatory exit are nothing more than decisions to shuffle primary
regulatory authority between different institutions who have
comparative advantages and disadvantages in addressing market
power in energy supply. Perhaps they should be approached as such.

processes that "identify and evaluate transmission needs driven by relevant Public Policy
Requirements").
164. Ruhl & Salzman, supra 3, at 1321-22.

